Does the One Percent Doctrine apply to Iran?

Amidst all of the eye opening revelations from Ron Suskind's new book (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), the overarching theme and title of the book got somewhat lost. (Unfortunately, I can't seem to link to the Froomkin blogpost from which this is excerpted.)

"Absorbing the possibility that al-Qaeda was trying to acquire a nuclear weapon, Cheney remarked that America had to deal with a new type of threat -- what he called a 'low-probability, high-impact event' -- and the U.S. had to do it 'in a way we haven't yet defined,' writes author Ron Suskind in his new book, The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies Since 9/11.

"And then Cheney defined it: 'If there's a 1% chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al-Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon, we have to treat it as a certainty in terms of our response. It's not about our analysis . . . It's about our response.' Suskind writes, 'So, now spoken, it stood: a standard of action that would frame events and responses from the Administration for years to come.' "

Whether or not this "doctrine" existed, or more importantly, still exists is a matter of some concern with the US currently staring down Iran with a newly issued June 12 deadline for Iran to stop enrichment.

Right now, there is no hard evidence that Iran is conducting any sort of nuclear weapons research and even their energy research is still at least five years, maybe ten, from yielding much of anything.

However, when operating on a 1% threshold, intelligence becomes moot because a shadow of a doubt is enough to start a war. A 1% case that Iran represents a real threat could be made fairly easily(far more easily than in Iraq): Known past ties to a terror organization(Hizbullah,) known previous efforts to enrich uranium covertly, a long history of strong anti-US statements, possible ties to AQ Khan and North Korea, a lack of intelligence about possible unknown weapons reasearch.

Those facts could certainly be argued as a 1% fractional likelihood that Iran represents a possible imminent threat, despite the fact that there is not one shred of intelligence indicating that Iran has made any strides or efforts towards a nuclear weapon.

Also, in this belief based war, you run into the impracticalities of a war launched with no accurate intel. How do you select bombing targets or sites of interest when a war is launched on the fractional possibility of WMD development? Which specific buildings and sites house the 99% fictional nuclear weapons program?

Sy Hersh published a really good article this week discussing military resistance to launching another 1% war.

It must be said that at this point all indications are that the current pressure is toward sanctions, and with the Chinese and Russians acting as counterbalancing inertia, a bombing campaign would be a tremendous act against the world community.

But Cheney's still lurking in the foreign policy arena of the White House. If "the doctrine" still applies, his doubts, and the doubts he can create in President Bush, might be enough justification to launch another 1% war.

Just something floating around in my mind.