"Inkblots," "superbases," and the intractible failure in Iraq

Back in May, I ran across a very interesting William Lind piece discussing a change of US tactics in Iraq. (article link is dead, sorry.)

At the time, the US was abandoning the "inkblot" strategy of daily patrols and localized counterinsurgency activities and was pulling back into "superbases" to undertake a more "reaction force" role. (In this post, I briefly describe the two strategies.)

In late July, in the face of what we then thought was unimaginable violence, the superbase strategy was abandoned for a return to a slightly newer more focused version of the "inkblot" approach which eventually turned into Operation Forward Together (which has since failed, and now we're talking again about withdrawing back to superbases and border protection.)

We're down to repeating strategies that haven't worked before. In the last year, we've gone from inkblots to superbases to inkblots, and now, back to superbases, and each time the violence has only gotten worse.

I'm just saying, the Baker commission, partial withdrawal, what seems to be the current administration plan..... You can march the troops up and down the hill as much as you want, but the flaw is more fundamental than the tactics.

And on training those Iraqi troops, the WaPo has a pretty hopeless piece on an American trainer's experience with one of the better Iraqi units.