More on "inkblots" vs. "superbases" in Iraq

This first got put into my head in the William Lind column at SFTT.org where he discussed the shift from "inkspot" to "superbase" strategy for dealing with the Iraqi insurgency. I find I keep thinking about this. The US is undergoing a major strategic shift in Iraq right now.

Very briefly, the inkblot strategy for defeating an insurgency is the dispersal of forces in small units out into the towns and communities to build very local areas of control. The soldiers stay in these areas for long periods and build up relationships with the locals thus undermining the insurgency. The descriptor "inkblot" is a visual metaphor for how those "safe" areas are intended to grow and spread taking more territory, more resources, and more population from the insurgents. The theory is that as these "inkblots" spread they will join up eventually defeating an insurgency from a huge number of local points.

The alternative, and the apparent current strategy, is to pull forces out of local areas to "superbases." The main draw of superbases is that with fewer points of deployment, those fewer points, and their access roads, etc., can be better defended leading to fewer casualties. The issue with "superbases" is that while they allow fewer casualties, they also put more distance between US forces and the local populations. Raids and force maneuvers can still be conducted, but there is little effort to hold ground. In theory, the US could act as the leading edge, clearing an area for Iraqi forces to then hold it, but that's not happening.

I write all of this because there is a major shift going on right now in US tactical strategy in Iraq. Again, this was discussed in the Lind piece, and this post was prompted by a post by a guestblogger at Americablog dicussing the same thing.

The reason all of this is significant is because at at tactical level, the inkblot strategy is the only way the Iraqi insurgency might be defeated, and yet the current motion is away from it, towards superbases. In theory, this could be a proper response if the Iraqi army is ready to hold territory, but all reasonable estimates, even those out of the administration, say that will not be the case for at least another year. (probably much longer. - mike)

So, realistically, somebody up the decision chain has made an evaluation that involves one or a combination of these three possibilities.

1) that defeating the Iraqi insurgency is not worth a cost they are willing to pay. In other words politics won't allow the casualties to implement the strategy most likely to quell the insurgency.

2) that the US can't successfully implement the inkblot strategy with the current number of troops.

3) that, for whatever reason, the military leaders no longer believe the insurgency can be beaten, merely beaten back.

I don't know which of these is right, although I would honestly bet that all three have figured into the shift in strategy. The bottom line is that the US is shifting on a tactical level away from defeating the insurgency and more towards responding to it. (watch for the word "containment.")

(I'm working outside my expertise here, so any comments or corrections would be appreciated.)