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Born at the Crest of the Empire

Friday, July 18, 2008

Did Robert Gates threaten Pakistan?

Not knowing Pakistani press, I don't know how much credibility to give this,
The United States has warned that it can conduct unilateral strikes inside Pakistan if it [Pakistan] does not take measures to stop Taliban activities, Aaj TV reported on Thursday. According to the channel, US Defence Secretary Robert Gates said that action in the Pak-Afghan border area was direly needed to mount pressure on the Taliban. He said it would be better if Pakistan exerted more pressure to check militant activities.
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6 Comments:

  • Of course, we already have been conducting drone strikes in the FATA for years now, and we've been bragging about it. And the world already knows that the Bush Doctrine is that the U.S. can do whatever the hell it wants, anywhere it wants to, as long as we say the magic word "terrorism".

    The Administration published this as their policy in Bush's first term. This was, in fact, the policy invoked in the invasion of Iraq. A country no longer has to actually threaten us to merit military action. If we merely say that we think it might threaten us (or our economy, our allies, or our "strategic position") in the future, then we consider ourselves justified in doing anything.
    Sadly, that is no exaggeration. I am hard pressed to think of one country (even among our allies) that could currently be excluded from "military action" under this broad policy.

    Once again, America furrows its brow and screams at Pakistan to "do something". Or else. Then we pound the table and scream at our allies to "do something". Or else. Then we grab Maliki by the lapels and scream at him to "do something". Or else. Then we brag about our "leadership" in the GWOT, take credit for everything good, and blame the failures on others who are "on notice" to shape up. Or else.

    How could this plan possibly fail?

    By Blogger Todd Dugdale , at 10:57 AM  

  • Well, You make very good points, and I agree with you, but, at the same time I would also say that something does need to be done.

    As I've said before, I really don't know what needs to be done, but Al Qaeda with safe haven in the tribal regions is just an unstable thing.

    Somehow, you have to separate the Pashtuns and Al Qaeda. They're not really one of a kind.

    By Blogger mikevotes, at 11:24 AM  

  • at the same time I would also say that something does need to be done.

    Quite right. I got off on a bit of a rant there.
    Something does need to be done. That "something" is certainly not continuing to make dire threats. Such was my point, to make it concisely.

    AQ in the FATA is merely filling a vacuum of power in the area. Pakistan really can't do anything; they've tried and failed. I don't really see support among Pashtuns in general for AQ. They are simply the power in the FATA, and they are willing to crush any tribal opposition, while distrust of the Pakistani government is historically strong. And we offer those in the FATA nothing but the chance to become collateral damage - repeatedly and in increasing numbers. Likewise, we offer nothing to the Pashtuns in Afghanistan proper; AQ money is their last resort, and often their only one.

    That means (as I've said before) reconstruction in Afghanistan, which would take a decade or more.
    It also means bringing specific pressure (and aid) on Pakistan to dismantle, reform, and marginalise the ISI. That would also take a decade or more. It also means the use of Muslim troops in a PR campaign.

    A military invasion of the FATA is as daunting an undertaking as the original invasion of Afghanistan was, largely because we have no proxies (such as the Northern Alliance) there, and because there is no "government" to restore to power. AQ will be in the FATA as long as the ISI lets them, and the ISI will let them as long as India is in Kashmir. The ISI must be taken out of the equation and India must be supported as a counterbalance.

    There are no simple answers. Basically everything we have done up to now has been an unfortunate waste of time, lives, and money (except in the north of the country, which is allied with India). We have tried a shortcut by relying on Musharraf - it all comes down to that. We need to admit it and stop grasping for quick fixes. We need to stop pretending we are fighting a WW2-style war against a government that can be decapitated or starved by attrition.

    Yeah, long comment, I know.

    By Blogger Todd Dugdale , at 1:29 PM  

  • Agreed. Threats ARE NOT working, at least how the threats are currently being presented. Right now, there's no real threat to the Pakistani aide, no explicit threats to favor India more, no realistic threats to embarrass the Pakistani leadership.

    I don't know if any of those really produce the results we want, but at least they're real threats.

    And you hit most of the subtle points along the Pak tribal border.

    It sounds like your point is that getting the ISI dislocated is the key as you present it. So, where do you press that, from above in the Pakistani politics, from below through "reconstruction"/making friends with the Pashtun tribesmen, from across by working with India, or from beside by trying to elevate the Pakistani military to more power than the ISI.

    All some, one, two....?

    By Blogger mikevotes, at 2:51 PM  

  • So, where do you press that,

    Two approaches, depending on the time-frame.
    The first and longer-term option is to push Musharraf out, let democracy take root and apply pressure on the political forces within Pakistan to dissolve the ISI. Carrot and stick: the stick is an alliance with India, the carrot is domestic and political stability. The Muslim world would probably be supportive of this if we played our cards right, as would Russia and China (both face potential Islamic insurgencies) to a more limited degree.

    The second and shorter term approach is for a military coup. The military could take out the worst of the ISI and their black market funding within a few years, but it could turn ugly. The military fears the ISI (and rightly so), but they also fear the consequences of doing nothing. It would take a very tangible carrot, as well as turning our back on India and its help. There is no effective stick. This is essentially the Bush approach with a specific focus on the ISI. Though it's a shorter path, it's much darker and oriented towards covert action, and unlikely to gain support from the rest of the world.

    With either approach, you need reconstruction along the lines of small-scale projects, micro-loans, and anti-corruption efforts (as I've outlined before) in Afghanistan proper. PR campaigns also can show the Pashtuns (through tours, etc.) how much better life is in the stable north, and Muslim troops doing aid work will help to win over opinion. We've made a lot of enemies among the rural population, and the less those people have to do with us the better. Let Turks, Moroccans, Indians, Egyptians, etc. be the faces that they see up close.

    By Blogger Todd Dugdale , at 3:50 PM  

  • Don't really have time to respond right now, just wanted you to know I read it.

    By Blogger mikevotes, at 6:48 PM  

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