The Maliki/US divergence
A very interesting article by Robert Reid (AP) looking at the split between the US and the Maliki government regarding how to deal with Sadr.
I think the bottom line comes down to the differing priorities. The Maliki government needs to defeat Sadr to maintain their hold on power while the US has an interest in keeping the Sadr door open in case the Maliki government loses power.
Maybe that's why the Maliki government charged into Basra without full US consult/planning. Maybe the Maliki government doesn't believe/trust that the US is a fully firm ally.
Their interests are different which puts them in a slightly oppositional stance where they're not fully cooperating as much as trying to influence and draw the other into their course of action.
So, how does that play out?
I think the bottom line comes down to the differing priorities. The Maliki government needs to defeat Sadr to maintain their hold on power while the US has an interest in keeping the Sadr door open in case the Maliki government loses power.
Maybe that's why the Maliki government charged into Basra without full US consult/planning. Maybe the Maliki government doesn't believe/trust that the US is a fully firm ally.
Their interests are different which puts them in a slightly oppositional stance where they're not fully cooperating as much as trying to influence and draw the other into their course of action.
So, how does that play out?
posted by mikevotes at
7:27 AM
5 Comments:
And of course there's the even larger divergence regarding the views of Iran between Maliki gvt and US.
I don't think anyone in Iraq views the US as an ally. A convenient tool, perhaps, but an ally? I don't think so. At least not in the conventional way. In the shifting sands of Iraq, the US is at once and ally and an enemy. It just depends on what month it is and whom you ask.
By
-epm, at 9:50 AM
Good point. And add the other regional players as well. Maliki and his Shia government are very leery of the Saudis.
By
mikevotes, at 10:43 AM
I don't know if I agree with your assessment that the U.S. is holding on the possibility of Sadr as a replacement for Maliki.
I think if Maliki is to loose power, he looses it to al-Hakim first and foremost, and the U.S. would prefer dealing with al-Hakim over Sadr (although Maliki is obviously preferable to both).
I think that the U.S. understands that open conflict with Sadr, although ultimately "winnable" (as much as anything can be winnable in a splintered insurgency environment) will result in massive losses for U.S. forces. The battles of 2004 are not that distant a memory and the U.S. was happy to achieve an uneasy truce with Sadr. Sadr knows he can't survive an all-out assault from the U.S. but the U.S. knows that the costs involved in taking on Mahdi forces to the end will exceed the tolerance level of the U.S. public especially considering that a victory will not ensure a lasting peace.
I might be overlooking something here, but I see the U.S's conciliatory stance towards Sadr as being motivated much more towards damage control than a calculated move to secure good relations in the event of a rise to supreme power of Sadr.
If Sadr were to somehow come to power (and again, al Hakim seems insurmountable in this regard) I think there is little chance he would cooperate with the U.S.
Again, it is likely I'm missing something here.
By
Praguetwin, at 3:02 PM
PragueTwin. I don't necessarily think they're hoping for such a thing, but I think they may be leaving open the possibility.
I must not have written clearly enough, because this statement you made, was what I intended.
"
"I see the U.S's conciliatory stance towards Sadr as being motivated much more towards damage control than a calculated move to secure good relations in the event of a rise to supreme power of Sadr."
"
It's not that the US wants a Sadr in power, but they see that possibility and are accommodating accordingly. They would be more than happy for Maliki to put Sadr out of the political arena, but the US doesn't have the same absolute existential level of incentive and has a different risk structure regarding Sadr.
It's that distance, more a shading than absolute, that I was intending to point to.
.....
And, I think if Sadr were to come to power somehow bloodlessly, both he and the US would work together to some degree. The language would likely be more anti- than the real working relationship. Both Sadr and the US would have incentives to establish at least a working relationship.
That however is all about 5th contingency planning. I definitely agree that Al-Hakim would be the US's next choice (assuming Allawi is a no go. Many in Washington would love for him to be there, but that ain't happening.)
I think we agree in general, though.
(I'm tired today, so if I'm a little sloppy, forgive me.)
By
mikevotes, at 3:54 PM
Yeah, I think we are in agreement but just not understanding each other. The U.S. definitely doesn't want Sadr in power. And you are right that if he did come to power, there would likely be some sort of cooperation between him and the U.S.
Where we disagree is in the current motivation for the U.S.'s conciliatory stance. You are looking at it like a 5th contingency should Sadr come to power. I'm looking at it as simple avoidance of conflict with a foe that ultimately can't beat the U.S. but could do extensive damage: beyond what the U.S. is willing to lose.
By
Praguetwin, at 5:01 PM
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