Some thoughts on Zarqawi - A Grand Bargain.
First, let me say that I'm glad Zarqawi has been stopped. In the lingo of the administration, this was a "bad guy." But let's just explore this story a minute. (Wipe the cobwebs off your tinfoil hat, because I have almost no substantiation for what I'm going to say. If you don't like speculation, skip this post.)
There has been some previous reporting that the Sunni insurgency, the indigenous insurgency which is pursuing solely local goals, had grown increasingly disenchanted with Zarqawi. While Zarqawi was pursuing his vision of Al Qaeda's goals (Al Qaeda didn't like him either,) the major factions in the Sunni insurgency are fighting for domestic political gain, for their relative place and power in the future political structure of Iraq. Although they were more than happy to utilize Zarqawi, as he began to craft himself as a hero/martyr, he became increasingly less useful and began to work at cross purposes. Early on, Zarqawi's successful recruitment of foreign fighters was vital as it provided a core of crack troops to the Sunnis, but as the fighting has stretched on for three years, idigineous Iraqi Sunnis have had the opportunity to "train up," making those foreign fighters loose guns. (I can't search for supporting links right now because of blogger. Aaaargh.)
Now, that being said, let's look at the timing of the major Iraq events over the last few days. Iraqi Prime minister Maliki agrees to a release of 2,500 Sunni prisoners, making a "downpayment" release of 600 yesterday morning. Within hours after the release, the knowledge of Zarqawi's whereabouts suddenly becomes certain,
Then, this morning, a short time after the announcement of Zarqawi's killing, Maliki is suddenly able to announce an agreement on new Defense and Interior Ministers.
This series of events reads to me like a grand bargain was struck between the Sunnis and the Maliki government. Release some Sunni prisoners, some early as good faith, and we will give you Zarqawi and stop opposition to the Ministerial appointments.
This deal makes sense for all sides. The Sunnis gain the release of thousands of their people, but more importantly rid themselves of Zarqawi in a way that they will not be blamed for. The Maliki government gets rid of a major security threat and gets it's ministerial appointments. Oh, and the US gets to claim the kill which is good domestic PR and takes the anger off the Shia government averting another wave of sectarian reprisals. It's win-win-win.
Just a working theory. It may change.
(I have no proof, and I find it unlikely that if this is true, we will get any, because the only way this works is if the official story holds. Also, I can't edit this once it goes up, so if there're any major glaring errors, please be kind.)
UPDATE: The NYTimes offers a vague description of "an Iraqi informant inside Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia provided the critical piece of intelligence."
And from a DoD press release, "Tips and intelligence from Iraqi senior leaders from his network led forces to al-Zarqawi."
There has been some previous reporting that the Sunni insurgency, the indigenous insurgency which is pursuing solely local goals, had grown increasingly disenchanted with Zarqawi. While Zarqawi was pursuing his vision of Al Qaeda's goals (Al Qaeda didn't like him either,) the major factions in the Sunni insurgency are fighting for domestic political gain, for their relative place and power in the future political structure of Iraq. Although they were more than happy to utilize Zarqawi, as he began to craft himself as a hero/martyr, he became increasingly less useful and began to work at cross purposes. Early on, Zarqawi's successful recruitment of foreign fighters was vital as it provided a core of crack troops to the Sunnis, but as the fighting has stretched on for three years, idigineous Iraqi Sunnis have had the opportunity to "train up," making those foreign fighters loose guns. (I can't search for supporting links right now because of blogger. Aaaargh.)
Now, that being said, let's look at the timing of the major Iraq events over the last few days. Iraqi Prime minister Maliki agrees to a release of 2,500 Sunni prisoners, making a "downpayment" release of 600 yesterday morning. Within hours after the release, the knowledge of Zarqawi's whereabouts suddenly becomes certain,
"Last night was the first time that we have had definitive, unquestionable information as to exactly where [al-Zarqawi] was located, knowing that we could strike that target without causing collateral damage to other Iraqi civilians and personnel in the area," Caldwell said.
Then, this morning, a short time after the announcement of Zarqawi's killing, Maliki is suddenly able to announce an agreement on new Defense and Interior Ministers.
This series of events reads to me like a grand bargain was struck between the Sunnis and the Maliki government. Release some Sunni prisoners, some early as good faith, and we will give you Zarqawi and stop opposition to the Ministerial appointments.
This deal makes sense for all sides. The Sunnis gain the release of thousands of their people, but more importantly rid themselves of Zarqawi in a way that they will not be blamed for. The Maliki government gets rid of a major security threat and gets it's ministerial appointments. Oh, and the US gets to claim the kill which is good domestic PR and takes the anger off the Shia government averting another wave of sectarian reprisals. It's win-win-win.
Just a working theory. It may change.
(I have no proof, and I find it unlikely that if this is true, we will get any, because the only way this works is if the official story holds. Also, I can't edit this once it goes up, so if there're any major glaring errors, please be kind.)
UPDATE: The NYTimes offers a vague description of "an Iraqi informant inside Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia provided the critical piece of intelligence."
And from a DoD press release, "Tips and intelligence from Iraqi senior leaders from his network led forces to al-Zarqawi."
4 Comments:
I like your analysis...rings true, but I think there's an x-factor in that there will be followers to al Zarqawi. He was too dynamic a personality and orgainzer not to have someone to step into his shoes, and that may continue to complicate the situation.
By Anonymous, at 7:35 PM
I like the analysis. My only problem is with the concept of al Zarqawi.
I except that he existed, but I'm not sure how much I can except of the construct surrounding him.
He was, after all, one of the finest propganda tools the Pentagon had. Dispensable, but useful in his time.
By Cartledge, at 8:58 PM
The trade-offs certainly sound right. Funny how after 3 years looking, we get a certain lock on this guy yesterday. I don't know.
All I know for sure is Blogger has been a pain the last few days.
By Unknown, at 9:01 PM
I really don't know if this is true. It does seem to fit, but I don't think I'll ever get proof.
And, as for the role of Zarqawi...
I think he had a cadre of loyal fighters, support staff, etc, and that he had a fighting force, largely foreign that fought for him/with him, but outside that, I don't know. You figure he had to have some degree of Iraqi Sunni support from some of the tribal leaders otherwise he'd have been caught long ago.
Kvatch, the succession is gonna be key. You're observation about his "dynamic personality" got me thinking that his successor might be the exact opposite. Certainly, he could've picked someone from further down the chain, but I'm willing to wager that his number two was probably more of a great manager, so there might be a power struggle between the manager and another charismatic. Just pondering.
Cartledge, no, he is not the supervillian he's been painted as, but at the same time, he has played a key role in utilizing his attacks to push the Sunni Shia conflict forward. But the thing is, with the conflict where it is now, he was pretty much superfluous. The violence has reached a self sustaining escalation.
Zarqawi as the supervillian suited almost everybody, the US, Al Qaeda, the Sunnis, the Shia, and especially Zarqawi. He's not as big as his shadow.
And, Time, I think that's what tipped me towards this conclusion, that after all this time of logjam, suddenly all the logs started to roll. So you look for the key leverage point.
And, on blogger, yes it's a pain sometimes, but it's free, and generally very easy. I don't do ads the same reason I don't do a counter, privacy, so it's not like I lose money. Just annoying.
But the world can live without my opinion for a few hours. If we hit days, then I'm gonna get worried about it.
I treat it like rain. Somtimes you just have to wait it out.
Mike
By mikevotes, at 9:35 PM
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