The failing "other war" - The spiralling problems of the militants on the Afghan/Pak border
I guess we should start with the AP's rendering of a new "Pentagon report that offers a dim view of progress in the nearly seven-year-old war."
Next, perhaps, let's visit Peshawar, Pakistan's largest city in the tribal provinces about 100 miles from Pakistan's capital, with the NYTimes,
Or, more ominously, McClatchy,
Then, there's Pakistan's latest response,
Last, perhaps this BBC analysis piece, "Can Pakistan's new anti-militancy strategy work?," which concludes,
Frankly, I don't have the slightest idea of how you would untie the knots stretching from Pakistan's halls of power through the tribal regions into Afghanistan.
I do know this, though. The opportunities were much greater in 2002/2003 when world opinion was far more on the US side, the Pakistanis were far more willing (and politically capable) to cooperate, and the Taleban and Al Qaeda was in fact broken and on the run.
And this president chose to go into Iraq.........
The Taliban has regrouped after its initial fall from power in Afghanistan and the pace of its attacks is likely to increase this year.....
Despite U.S. and coalition efforts to capture and kill key leaders, the Taliban is likely to "maintain or even increase the scope and pace of its terrorist attacks and bombings in 2008."
The Taliban, it said, has "coalesced into a resilient insurgency."
Next, perhaps, let's visit Peshawar, Pakistan's largest city in the tribal provinces about 100 miles from Pakistan's capital, with the NYTimes,
In the last two months, Taliban militants have suddenly tightened the noose on this city of three million people......
The threat to Peshawar is a sign of the Taliban’s deepening penetration of Pakistan and of the expanding danger that the militants present to the entire region, including nearby supply lines for NATO and American forces in Afghanistan.
Or, more ominously, McClatchy,
Heavily armed Islamic militants have massed on the outskirts of Peshawar, the strategic provincial capital in northwest Pakistan, and the Pakistani government has dramatically stepped up security around the city amid fears that it could fall.
Taliban groups and other extremist warlords now threaten Peshawar from three sides.....
Then, there's Pakistan's latest response,
Pakistani forces bombarded suspected militant hideouts with mortar shells Saturday as the government launched a major offensive against Taliban fighters threatening the main city in the country's volatile northwest, officials said.....
"All bazaars are shut and residents have been asked not to come out of their homes," he said.
Last, perhaps this BBC analysis piece, "Can Pakistan's new anti-militancy strategy work?," which concludes,
"It is still not clear if our security establishment has really decided to dump the Taleban."
If Mr Khatak's doubts are well-founded, then many fear we are in for a period of "cosmetic" military actions aimed at containing the militants, rather than eliminating the militant threat altogether.
Frankly, I don't have the slightest idea of how you would untie the knots stretching from Pakistan's halls of power through the tribal regions into Afghanistan.
I do know this, though. The opportunities were much greater in 2002/2003 when world opinion was far more on the US side, the Pakistanis were far more willing (and politically capable) to cooperate, and the Taleban and Al Qaeda was in fact broken and on the run.
And this president chose to go into Iraq.........
5 Comments:
I don't see any good plan of action, either. We could easily spend the next 30 years in Afghanistan and have an identical situation to the one at present.
Still, I see four things (at least) that could be done that would improve our chances of stabilising Afghanistan/Pakistan:
- Greatly improve our alliance with India, and increase military aid (lethal and non-lethal).
- Bring in more Muslim countries and Muslim troops. Turkey is it, so far. Uzbeks, Tajiks, Egyptians, Morrocans, Indians and even Iran can make significant "hearts and minds" contributions.
- Start an aggressive effort against low and mid-level corruption using stings and audits, with serious penalties for taking bribes or graft.
- Begin a broad micro-lending programme for start-up small businesses.
And it goes without saying that the civilian Administration hacks that bungled this effort will have to go, along with the absurd neocon toadies who believed we can invade all our troubles away. It's doubtful NATO will stick with this effort for five more years; certainly not ten.
By Todd Dugdale , at 5:18 PM
I think B is the most immediately viable.
Openly working with India will create as much illwill as we would benefit, however, you gotta figure their intelligence folks do have some good inside on the Pakitani militants. Admittedly, it's the Kashmir group, but they could provide alot.
Your bribes idea is good, but I think it would be seen as imperial, as the US trying to impose on their soveriegnity. (How the hell do you spell that?)
Microloans are a really good idea, but they require some management, so they would be good in the broader country, not so much directly in the problem areas. But it would bring countrywide goodwill which could give the Pakistani government more space.
Which brings us back to B. The only problem would be, how do you get them to sign on. I think the best bet would be to try to arrange a collective force rather than picking individual countries.
But you'd have to give up some control and risk some of these soldiers "intermingling."
By mikevotes, at 6:32 PM
Openly working with India will create as much illwill as we would benefit, however, you gotta figure their intelligence folks do have some good inside on the Pakitani militants. Admittedly, it's the Kashmir group, but they could provide alot.
I'll grant you that. The strategy with India would be a stick against Pakistan, since carrots have proven a failure. As I've pointed out before, Pakistan has a vested interest in Afghanistan remaining unstable because this thwarts India's influence in the north. The Northern Alliance was backed by India. So the essence of this tactic is to say to Pakistan, "Okay, you don't want to help us on this. Maybe your enemy would like to benefit from our friendship". Pakistan is a lost cause, and India would like to improve its image in the Muslim world.
India also has a substantial Muslim population incorporated into the military, which rolls into "B".
"B" would require the abandonment of the "NATO concept", which was employed because Bush could bully NATO into participation but not the UN. There is little credibility in (and less support for) the idea that Afghanistan is a NATO issue.
Which brings us back to B. The only problem would be, how do you get them to sign on.
Bush couldn't do this, but Obama could. You present the issue as a regional crisis, not as the West against Islam. You call the Muslim world on the concept of Muslim brotherhood, and tell them that they can do what we can't: gain the trust of the innocent civilians whose lives are threatened by continuing conflict. Iran already has interests in controlling the border (drug and arms trade). India obviously has interests. As for the other countries, it would mostly be aid missions and local policing at a level of 100 troops or less; more of a PR campaign than a military one. Basically we'd have to stay out of their way. The less control we have over the effort, the more effective it will be, precisely because it's not "us". It's "them" helping "them".
Your bribes idea is good, but I think it would be seen as imperial,
That ship has sailed, IMO. The corruption is hated, and it drains the development efforts.
The general idea is to create better conditions in the stable areas to show the Afghans that there's an alternative. It's not a silver bullet; it's an effort to improve our odds. As I said, the military part will continue for decades.
By Todd Dugdale , at 9:26 AM
Quick note. I'm kind of conflating Afghanistan (specifically the south and east) and the tribal regions of Pakistan. I don't know if I just read past your comment too quickly, or what.
I think it's pretty reasonable that there was alot of this three way diplomacy in the India Nuclear deal. I think the problem is that, in this four way game, the US can't afford to lose the government of any side for vastly different reasons.
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Again, I think a Muslim regional force would be the best answer.
One more complication, it would have to be a force respected by the people there, and over into Pakistan, if you really want that new shot at hearts and minds, so you've got to deal with religion and all the complicated intraMuslim politics.
Once they're there, the rebuilding issues become viable.
And the loss of control might be difficult for the US to take. Especially since a president would have to take responsibility for any terrorism or nastiness coming out of the region.
And, there's a whole different set of problems in the opium west. I think the muslim troops are less essential there, and the microprojects, graft fixing, etc would find very receptive ground. That's more straight warlordism, less Islamic cause.
By mikevotes, at 11:09 AM
Screw Pakistan. They had their chance.
India neutralises Pakistan, and Muslim participation neutralises the jihad aspect. Pakistan either helps or it undermines the collective Islamic effort and makes India look good. It's a "stick" approach, yes, but one that gives Pakistan an honourable "out".
The nuke deal failed because hard-line Communists in India resented both the arrogant approach Bush took and the requirement for inspections. If Obama treats India as an equal partner and drops the bully attitude, India comes down squarely on our side - no doubts there. Likewise with the Muslim coalition. Equal partners. It's a new paradigm, or rather, an old one that Bush has discarded.
By Todd Dugdale , at 12:35 PM
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