"The surge is just starting."
The last US troops in "the surge" are finally posted, and man, am I getting tired of the spin.
That's right. The hundreds of US troops and thousands of Iraqis that have died over the last months don't count because the full force wasn't in. Just because we've had a three month presence in some of these neighborhoods as violence and killings have continued, that doesn't count.
With the full deployment in Diyala for two months, that didn't count either, because it's that last neighborhood in Baghdad that is causing the killings in Diyala.
I guess it's officially starting now because the early report card was so bad.
(Oh, and please ignore the political and reconstruction elements of "the surge". Apparently, we told the Iraqis to hold off on these until we were able to "execute the strategy as it was designed.")
In a broader sense, it is becoming far more clear exactly who is in charge in this war. As the US initially deployed in "the surge," combatant groups from all sides pulled back to view the new US positioning. Violence went down.
Now, with a larger US force in place, they have decided to return to previous activities, and the violence has risen again.
Perhaps the best example is the first day after the Askariyah shrine bombing where there was relatively little retributional violence. Many may try to credit that to the US presence, but I think it points more towards the level of control of the insurgent and militia leaders.
The lesson is that they can turn it on and off like a faucet, no matter how US troops are arrayed.
They're in control, not us.
(Friday prayers today.)
(By the way, what ever happened to the 5 captured Britons? Or the two missing US soldiers?)
"The strategic movement of forces into the theater is complete, and the surge is just starting," said U.S. military spokesman Lt. Col. Christopher Garver. "Now that the force is here, we'll see the counterinsurgency start in full swing, and we'll be able to execute the strategy as it was designed."
That's right. The hundreds of US troops and thousands of Iraqis that have died over the last months don't count because the full force wasn't in. Just because we've had a three month presence in some of these neighborhoods as violence and killings have continued, that doesn't count.
With the full deployment in Diyala for two months, that didn't count either, because it's that last neighborhood in Baghdad that is causing the killings in Diyala.
I guess it's officially starting now because the early report card was so bad.
The final contingent of US troops in the "surge" against Iraq's resistance deploys today amid deepening gloom in Washington at the military's failure to reduce violence and defeat the insurgency.
(Oh, and please ignore the political and reconstruction elements of "the surge". Apparently, we told the Iraqis to hold off on these until we were able to "execute the strategy as it was designed.")
In a broader sense, it is becoming far more clear exactly who is in charge in this war. As the US initially deployed in "the surge," combatant groups from all sides pulled back to view the new US positioning. Violence went down.
Now, with a larger US force in place, they have decided to return to previous activities, and the violence has risen again.
Perhaps the best example is the first day after the Askariyah shrine bombing where there was relatively little retributional violence. Many may try to credit that to the US presence, but I think it points more towards the level of control of the insurgent and militia leaders.
The lesson is that they can turn it on and off like a faucet, no matter how US troops are arrayed.
They're in control, not us.
(Friday prayers today.)
(By the way, what ever happened to the 5 captured Britons? Or the two missing US soldiers?)
posted by mikevotes at
8:14 AM
8 Comments:
"As the US initially deployed in "the surge," combatant groups from all sides pulled back to view the new US positioning. Violence went down.
Now, with a larger US force in place, they have decided to return to previous activities, and the violence has risen again."
If this is a surprise to anyone, they should be taken out back and beaten severely about the head and shoulders... This was the textbook prediction made by nearly every non-political critic of the escalation from the get go.
This mealymouthed whining about the "surge" not being fully in place so we have no idea if it will work or not, is like saying that despite the ultrasound we can't predict the gender of an eight-month fetus until we see it outside the womb. What rubbish. It is either disingenuous or delusional to think this strategy is anything more than a flawed variation of a flawed strategy.
By
-epm, at 10:29 AM
No, it's not a surprise, but I felt it needed to be said to gird my argument.
"The surge not in place" rhetoric is all about buying time.
Plus, it's a huge distraction.
The real issue is not whether the Us can tame Baghdad for a few months, but whether the reason can be found for the combatant forces to stop fighting.
The stats on "the surge" are largely a distraction from the larger issues of political reconciliation.
By
mikevotes, at 11:26 AM
The real issue is not whether the Us can tame Baghdad for a few months, but whether the reason can be found for the combatant forces to stop fighting.
Exactly. How do we stop the various groups from wanting to kill each other (and us)?
One promising sign might be the Anbar Suunis reported turning against the al Qaeda elements. If this is indeed the case, it's not because of our escalation, but from al Qaeda's own over reaching.
By
-epm, at 12:31 PM
Yes, but I would add the complication that the reason they're fighting Al Qaeda has more to do with their longer term struggle for power.
This is not an action designed to help the US or the Maliki government, but instead to gain more control and coordination of their politics and violence.
By
mikevotes, at 3:14 PM
True enough. But if the Anbar Sunnni see that we share a common enemy in the foreign al Qaeda forces, that at least my yield some fruit for dialog... if not exactly common goals.
Had Bush not so rigidly dictated the Iraqi election time line (talk about your arbitrary benchmarks) perhaps it would have been possible to avoid the Sunni boycott that, I think, precipitated the crisis in governance know euphemistically as the Iraqi "Unity" government.
Even if the Sunni and Shia remain hostile, if they can unite in rejection of al Qaeda in Iraq that would be a first step in finding common cause and perhaps a national identity. Baby steps, but baby steps in the right direction, I hope.
By
-epm, at 3:44 PM
Yeah, if anything though, the elections should have been much sooner. Garner wanted to hold the first provincials 90 days after Baghdad, but he was removed because of the fear of a Shia dominated state.
And, I'll accept your Sunni/Shia finding common cause against Al Qaeda argument, but that's just not my sense.
My sense is that the Sunni insurgency has no reached a level of supply and sophistication that they no longer need Al Qaeda.
At the beginning they needed the money, weapons, tactics and support, but my sense is that they've built enough capacity that Al Qada's more expendable to them now.
I don't have an answer, it's just my sense.
By
mikevotes, at 4:27 PM
I didn't know that about Garner and the desire for early elections. Another example of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory? At least it's another example, I think, of the neo-cons having a very specific vision for how Iraq would fall into fawning American submission, and they wouldn't tolerate any deviation form the master plan. Just my own bit of truthiness.
I don't think, today, the Sunni and Shia see a common cause, but I'm hoping diplomats could shape their thinking to see the advantages of such a common cause. However, as long as powerful segments of the Iraqi population see the US as wanting a permanent occupation, I think we'll be hard pressed to convince them that their Islamic cousins are more of a threat to their independence than the "zionist, christian crusaders." We would have to do something of balancing act of drawing down our troops at the same time we supply the, as yet unformed, Sunni/Shia confederation with support in it's efforts to purge al Qaeda. But I doubt we have the credibility necessary to pull this off.
Is it just me, or are we saying that the real path to stability in Iraq is working directly with the militias and not through the "Unity" government? Will we need a government-forming do-over in Iraq before we can move forward? The more we push the current government structure forward and the more we build upon it flawed foundations, the more we guarantee failure?
By
-epm, at 7:41 PM
Yeah, the Garner thing has always stuck in my craw because that was one of the main reasons Garner was replaced by the disaster that was Bremer.
They wanted to put a puppet in (Chalabi) and Garner's plan would have prevented that. (They still believed they could control things.)
To the broader point, it's really a question of motivations. The Iraqi people have rage and powerlessness driven by the violence and difficult living conditions. Their politicians are then taking that emotion and focusing it around to where it will do the most good for their political cause.
Each political faction has their own reasons for what they do. The problem is that right now, there is no motivation for anyone to be first to the table. The Shia elements are fighting for the national mantle and control of the government. The Sunnis are fighting to maintain their leverage in the broader struggle for rights. Everybody attacks the Americans because it's good for the morale of their movement.
And on a lower level, you have the violence driven by control of neighborhoods and the money that generates.
There's a whole lot of reasons for them to keep fighting, but as yet nothing for them worth stopping the fighting.
And, a weak Maliki just raises the stakes. I really don't think the answer will be found in this now crippled government, the problem is what's next may be more effective, but not as good.
By
mikevotes, at 9:23 PM
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