The Taleban bet it all in Afghanistan
In all the years of insurgent combat in Afghanistan from the British to the present, this is extremely rare.
Winter offensives are very tough for the Taleban because the snows significantly cut down the access to the "safe base" mountain areas along the Afghan/Pakistan border leaving them more limited on resupply, support, and retreat.
The assumption, I guess, is that they now have a strong enough foothold in the south of the country to conduct their rear operations there, but at the same time, this could allow NATO a key opportunity to ravage an isolated force.
This is a big gamble from their side.
The question is, I guess, just how much civilian support does the Taleban now have in southern Afghanistan? I think it's alot. This winter could decide that war.
Also of note in Afghanistan,
The Taliban are planning a major winter offensive combining their diverse factions in a push on the Afghan capital, Kabul, intelligence analysts and sources among the militia have revealed.
The thrust will involve a concerted attempt to take control of surrounding provinces, a bid to cut the key commercial highway linking the capital with the eastern city of Jalalabad, and operations designed to tie down British and other Nato troops in the south.
Winter offensives are very tough for the Taleban because the snows significantly cut down the access to the "safe base" mountain areas along the Afghan/Pakistan border leaving them more limited on resupply, support, and retreat.
The assumption, I guess, is that they now have a strong enough foothold in the south of the country to conduct their rear operations there, but at the same time, this could allow NATO a key opportunity to ravage an isolated force.
This is a big gamble from their side.
The question is, I guess, just how much civilian support does the Taleban now have in southern Afghanistan? I think it's alot. This winter could decide that war.
Also of note in Afghanistan,
British forces in southern Afghanistan are experiencing periods of lockdown in two key areas, halting patrols to avoid suicide bombings by the Taliban. A senior officer called the security threat "critical"..
2 Comments:
RAND from mid 2004:
Mao’s concepts of guerrilla warfare were later translated (in the 1961 book “On Guerrilla Warfare,” by S. B. Griffith) into three phases of insurgency.
The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong refined the phases into a well-practiced and deadly military science. They succeeded in overthrowing the government of South Vietnam after the United States tired of a seemingly endless war and ultimately withdrew its armed forces.
According to Mao, the first phase of insurgency is a “survival” phase. The start of the insurgency in Iraq coincided with the end of major combat operations in May and the removal of the Hussein regime.
Mao said that during the first phase of insurgency, the infrastructure of guerrilla warfare is developed: a recruiting campaign, repositioning of weapons and munitions, and a new ideology of resistance and a propaganda apparatus to spread the ideology. All this happened in Iraq.
Next comes a small-scale offensive designed more to shake the determination of the invading forces and their countrymen than to have a serious military impact.
[...]
A successful first phase of insurgency can ignite a second phase of larger-scale offensive activity — and this is what U.S. forces confront in Iraq today.
In this phase, the insurgency progresses from sporadic, relatively small- scale activities to carefully planned, coordinated, calamitous attacks.
These attacks strike highly symbolic targets — as happened with the attacks on the United Nations’ and Red Cross headquarters and the Jordanian Embassy in Iraq.
[...]
In the second phase, the insurgency’s intelligence-gathering capability grows, and that enables progressively more sophisticated, frequent and deadly activity. A synergy comes to exist between the insurgency’s intelligence-collection capability and increased hostile action.
[...]
The insurgency also grows decentralized in the second phase, making the killing or capture or key individuals, such as Hussein, less significant than in conventional militaries.
“Command cannot be highly centralized,” Mao wrote, in words that could describe today’s Iraqi resistance. “If it were, guerrilla action would be too limited in scope.”
Mao said the third phase of insurgency is the decisive stage.
At this point, an insurgency has grown large enough to have a real chance of victory with a combination of conventional and unconventional warfare. This phase has not arrived in Iraq, and if the United States is successful, it never will.
Iraq’s insurgents can’t defeat U.S. forces on the battlefield, and the insurgents know it. Unable to advance to a third phase of insurgency, a realistic goal of the insurgents is to stay deadlocked in a second phase until they can drive out the U.S.-led coalition.
By Bravo 2-1, at 3:47 PM
That's great. Shortly after Samarra, I read a really good article discussing the techniues including Mao's additions.
However, it did not make the key last point that you included about a neverending phase 2.
Mike
By mikevotes, at 9:25 PM
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