The basic flaw in Operation Together Forward
The premise of the tactics of Together Forward is an extension of the overall "stand up/stand down" strategy. The theory was that the US forces would "clear" a neighborhood of militants and weapons and then turn that pacified neighborhood over to Iraqi forces to maintain security.
Because of limited troop numbers, the "commanders on the ground" have been forced to attack the neighborhoods of Baghdad serially, several at a time.
Beyond the problems of the Iraqi forces inability or unwillingness to keep those neighborhoods peaceful, often aiding the militants, there are other flaws imposed by the "serial" nature of the plan. The mobility issue, the "whack a mole," is the first and most obvious, but I would like to offer a second flaw.
If I live in Sadr City, for instance, and my neighborhood is not targeted in the first round, it is in my interests to create as much violence elsewhere in the city as I can.
If the US "clears" Dora, or Shaab, or Ur, it is in my interests to immediately create as much bloodshed there as possible the moment the US forces pull out.
This will serve to undermine overall confidence in the strategy possibly terminating it, and, at the very least, force the US to go back into those neighborhoods stalling the approach to mine.
In other words, by "clearing" a neighborhood, the US recreates it as a prime target for further bloodshed without the local militia forces to protect it.
(To allow those neighborhoods to fail would be a political diaster for the US undermining their credibility and any future cooperation they might receive.)
The logical US solution to this would be to go next to Sadr City, which they are currently doing in small pinpoint raids, but to openly attempt the type of roadblock, house to house searches against the Mahdi militia that have been done elsewhere would lead to US casualties unlike anything we've yet seen.
I don't have an answer. In the end, the only answer is going to be a political solution. The US will have to accept the dual government/militia factional power structure and the civil war that has already evolved from that.
I know that doesn't win an election, but that's the reality.
(And let me say very clearly that I don't fault the generals and commanders on this. They are enacting the best possible strategy with the hand they've been given. They have been asked to impossibly pacify the 5 million people of Baghdad with 15,000 US troops.)
Because of limited troop numbers, the "commanders on the ground" have been forced to attack the neighborhoods of Baghdad serially, several at a time.
Beyond the problems of the Iraqi forces inability or unwillingness to keep those neighborhoods peaceful, often aiding the militants, there are other flaws imposed by the "serial" nature of the plan. The mobility issue, the "whack a mole," is the first and most obvious, but I would like to offer a second flaw.
If I live in Sadr City, for instance, and my neighborhood is not targeted in the first round, it is in my interests to create as much violence elsewhere in the city as I can.
If the US "clears" Dora, or Shaab, or Ur, it is in my interests to immediately create as much bloodshed there as possible the moment the US forces pull out.
This will serve to undermine overall confidence in the strategy possibly terminating it, and, at the very least, force the US to go back into those neighborhoods stalling the approach to mine.
In other words, by "clearing" a neighborhood, the US recreates it as a prime target for further bloodshed without the local militia forces to protect it.
(To allow those neighborhoods to fail would be a political diaster for the US undermining their credibility and any future cooperation they might receive.)
The logical US solution to this would be to go next to Sadr City, which they are currently doing in small pinpoint raids, but to openly attempt the type of roadblock, house to house searches against the Mahdi militia that have been done elsewhere would lead to US casualties unlike anything we've yet seen.
I don't have an answer. In the end, the only answer is going to be a political solution. The US will have to accept the dual government/militia factional power structure and the civil war that has already evolved from that.
I know that doesn't win an election, but that's the reality.
(And let me say very clearly that I don't fault the generals and commanders on this. They are enacting the best possible strategy with the hand they've been given. They have been asked to impossibly pacify the 5 million people of Baghdad with 15,000 US troops.)
posted by mikevotes at
7:03 AM
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