Let's review the Iraq strategy

For the sake of this post examining the strategy for Iraq, let's accept the premise of administration competence and clarity. (I know.)

In recent speeches, Bush has made clear that Al Qaeda wants to make Iraq its central front in the war on terror, and to that end, fighting the battle of Al Qaeda's choosing, we must defeat them there.

Now, the plan is not actually for the US to defeat Al Qaeda, but instead to stalemate them and train the Iraqi forces so that they can defeat Al Qaeda. (As Tony Snow said today, the US is not trying to "subdue every bad guy," but "train Iraqi forces so they can do the job.")

The heart of Al Qaeda in Iraq is in Anbar. Best estimates are that there are about 5,000- 10,000 foreign/Al Qaeda fighters there with good local support. Thus far, the US with about 30,000 troops, and another 15,000 Iraqi troops (about 7,500 actually active - I cant' find the link,) has fought for roughly three years and is now being assessed as losing the massive province to Al Qaeda.

So, how exactly are the fledgling Iraqi forces supposed to conquer an Al Qaeda element (that wasn't there before the US invasion) when 30,000 of the best trained troops in the world haven't been able to do so in three years.

George Bush's plan is to turn over the "central front in the war on terror" to those fledgling forces and the goodwill of a fragile Iraqi government.

That's the administration's plan to defeat Al Qaeda, to let the Iraqis handle it.

"The decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century, and the calling of our generation" is being turned over to the Iraqi government.

(Ditto for Afghanistan.)

(Longer term: Even if you were to assume that the Iraqi forces were capable of this job, why would Iraq not go the route of Pakistan, preferring political stability so long as Al Qaeda focuses its efforts outside the country?

Or, you could look at the very real possibilty of Iraq fracturing either completely or informally under the currently proposed "federalism" legislation that would allow sectarian military forces and armed borders. What incentive would a central Iraqi government have to enter the Sunni areas under force and go after Al Qaeda so long as they didn't attack the government?

Or, let's look at the possibility that Iran ends up wielding excessive influence in Iraq. Al Qaeda has stated three major goals. To remove the US from the region, to overthrow the Saudi Arabian government, and (later) to remove the Israelis. I think it's highly unlikely that the Iranians would work directly with Al Qaeda for a number of reasons, but as Al Qaeda actions might coincide with Iranian goals, an Iraqi government influenced by Iran might not pursue them as vigorously as the US would want.

That's all assuming the US has pulled out, and Al Qaeda focused on their other goals rather than civil war. If they got safe haven, the foreign fighters don't need civil war except as it might please their Sunni hosts.)