"Take that hill"
I'm very sick of the argument that Iraq policy should be determined by "commanders in the field."
The truth is that politicians are supposed to play a key role in defining the goals which the military then undertakes. The construction of our government is such that the politicians set the goals, and the military is then tasked with executing those goals.
(I do find it odd that with all the other grabs for unitary power, this president is willing (rhetorically, at least) to cede the fundamental executive power of civilian control over the military.)
I keep thinking back to some of the battles in Vietnam and Korea when units were told to "take that hill."
Even in the most hopeless situation, you can always find some officer who is willing to try to "take that hill" no matter the cost, but finding an officer willing to try does not in fact mean that the goal is achievable or advisable.
We now have military officers in charge in Iraq who say that they can "take that hill" (increasingly tepidly I've noticed,) but it is their superiors' job to determine if taking that hill is worth the cost.
Because of his personal involvement, Bush has developed a near monomania about that hill named Iraq, and that has skewed his evaluation of benefit versus cost. At this point, Bush is willing to listen to anyone who claims to be able to take that hill, and, because of this misallocation of resources and effort, we're losing the broader war.
(Sorry, I try not to editorialize too often, but this one came out.)
The truth is that politicians are supposed to play a key role in defining the goals which the military then undertakes. The construction of our government is such that the politicians set the goals, and the military is then tasked with executing those goals.
(I do find it odd that with all the other grabs for unitary power, this president is willing (rhetorically, at least) to cede the fundamental executive power of civilian control over the military.)
I keep thinking back to some of the battles in Vietnam and Korea when units were told to "take that hill."
Even in the most hopeless situation, you can always find some officer who is willing to try to "take that hill" no matter the cost, but finding an officer willing to try does not in fact mean that the goal is achievable or advisable.
We now have military officers in charge in Iraq who say that they can "take that hill" (increasingly tepidly I've noticed,) but it is their superiors' job to determine if taking that hill is worth the cost.
Because of his personal involvement, Bush has developed a near monomania about that hill named Iraq, and that has skewed his evaluation of benefit versus cost. At this point, Bush is willing to listen to anyone who claims to be able to take that hill, and, because of this misallocation of resources and effort, we're losing the broader war.
(Sorry, I try not to editorialize too often, but this one came out.)
posted by mikevotes at
9:22 AM
7 Comments:
More incisive editorials please!
By
Anonymous, at 9:10 AM
>I'm very sick of the argument that Iraq policy should be determined by "commanders in the field."<
Me too. But you can see the trick. They know the public will always believe the commanders.
By
Anonymous, at 9:44 AM
Duyba in Iraq, like Hitler in Europe, willfully ignored the advice of their military commanders and built a strategy based on a flawed worldview. Duyba’s inability to formulate a new strategy in response to his abysmal failures to-date is proof enough that he is no longer, if he ever was, capable of leading our country. And the powerlessness of the Democratic House to force this moron to abandon his failed “War on Terror” will only result in the unnecessary death or injury to thousands of additional solders. We’re pissing away our country’s treasure and neither the president nor the congress has the balls to do what’s right. Is it any wonder their public support has fallen to historic lows?
By
BobbyV, at 10:21 AM
Squamous, thank you. I've just been to so many blogs that disintegrate into rants that I'm very shy about it. I don't want to be that guy.
...
Anon, It also plays very cleverly to the "support the troops" patriotism, and offers some immunization against attacks from Senators who voted for Petraeus.
...
Bobby,
That's actually a really big point. Some while back, I wrote a long post saying the US was constantly behind the reality, we were still strategizing against Saddam during the insurgency, still strategizing against the Sunni insurgency as the militias arrived, still thinking about militias during the civil war.
Your point, I think is much broader, that we're focusing on Iraq while the terror problem metastatizes, but it's the same thing.
It's impossible to develop a strategy if you do not see the world as it is.
(As an aside, I do agree with the issue embodied in "war on terror" although I reject the phraseology because the answers to the issues of terrorism are not war.
There are people who want to attack the US (for a whole variety of reasons) but issuing a war with them does no more than elevate them. The efforts should be to marginalize these guys within their own countries and cultures, not raise them up as an enemy.
There's a real issue with terrorism, but the manner and language with which it has been approached has been disastrous, leading to more terrorism and more ommitted terrorists.)
By
mikevotes, at 11:50 AM
Great editorial Mike, I would rather read you than anyone at the WSJ or NYTimes.
It is insidious what Bush is doing, but it’s not really a new tactic. The implication is that the policy was not faulty just the execution. “I’ve offered to give the commanders what they need,” is his response. Congressional pushback on the Iraq strategy is termed as, “not supporting the troops.” The military is being held hostage in his attempt to salvage a failed policy. The cracks are starting to show, but I don’t know how long the military will put up with this squeeze of being caught in the middle.
By
Anonymous, at 12:48 PM
Right. "The implication is that the policy was not faulty just the execution."
This is also the underlying premise of the blame Iraq movement.
That the vision was somehow pure, but it is flaws in the enactors that are the problem.
And, it's always dicey to try and pin down a military attitude. By mid-2005 you were already starting to hear from the ground soldiers and NCO's that their only goal was to get their unit out in one piece.
The theoretical side, planning, etc has been slowly splitting on the war since 2004.
And, once you get up to career officers, you can't always take what they say as how they feel. I don't blame them, but being against Iraq could be a career ender if some pro Iraq colonel gets promoted above you some day.
Oh, and then there's the career Penmtagon folks who have been around since the broken military of Vietnam and are seeing their life's work being destroyed in this war.
For the officers, I think the retired folks give about the truest opinion, but even they are guarded.
By
mikevotes, at 1:24 PM
Unwarranted optimism in military situations can be jsut as dangerous as unwarranted skepticism. If it is too early to assess the surge, then why has the Administration been pointing to anything that could possibly be considered positive as proof that the surge is working for the past four months? It seems like it's never too early for unwarranted optimism among the ranks of the neocons, but sober skepticism is always "premature".
By
Todd Dugdale , at 11:51 PM
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