Allawi as a pawn in crafting reconciliation.
Allawi's push for Prime Ministership push is apparently being funded by Hazem Shaalan, a former INC(Chalabi) associate and $1 billion dollar embezzler of Iraqi military funds. Shaalan stole his fortune while Defense Minister under Allawi's previous government spending the defense budget on crumbling second hand Polish weapons.
Now we have a secondary claim that (from David Ignatius) that Allawi's support is coming from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
But, in the end, I believe Allawi is a pawn.
The Bush administration has been trying for months to find a pressure point to force Prime Minister Maliki into some move towards reconciliation, and the Sunni withdrawal from the government, coupled with back room communications from the Saudis, suddenly pressed this effort into full drive.
Allawi is the US threat to Maliki, act or else.
And to some degree, it appears to have worked.
The problem is that by getting here through the weakening Maliki (and creating Sunni militias,) the Sunnis now hold alot of the cards, and they're no longer playing for crumbs.
The Sunnis have gotten (at least) proposals and language for alot of what they wanted, and yet it's still not enough.
The core problem of this strategy is that it's a gamble. The assumption of these political deals is that a weakened Maliki still speaks for the Shia.
But Maliki has no militia. He has no political sway. He has no real force in Iraq.
So, a statement of political reconciliation has been arrived at, but the question is, is there anything behind it but the shell of a Prime Minister that was? Does this deal make Maliki stronger or weaker as a Prime Minister?
Let's remember where the power resides, with the guns in the street.
(Sadr has not returned to the government. And what do the Iranians want?)
Now we have a secondary claim that (from David Ignatius) that Allawi's support is coming from Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
But, in the end, I believe Allawi is a pawn.
The Bush administration has been trying for months to find a pressure point to force Prime Minister Maliki into some move towards reconciliation, and the Sunni withdrawal from the government, coupled with back room communications from the Saudis, suddenly pressed this effort into full drive.
Allawi is the US threat to Maliki, act or else.
And to some degree, it appears to have worked.
Iraq's fractious political leaders squeezed out a broadbrush deal early Monday aimed at bridging the sectarian divide under mounting pressure from Washington.
The problem is that by getting here through the weakening Maliki (and creating Sunni militias,) the Sunnis now hold alot of the cards, and they're no longer playing for crumbs.
However, initial reaction from Sunni parties suggested the deal would not be enough to lure them back to Maliki's government.
The Sunnis have gotten (at least) proposals and language for alot of what they wanted, and yet it's still not enough.
The core problem of this strategy is that it's a gamble. The assumption of these political deals is that a weakened Maliki still speaks for the Shia.
But Maliki has no militia. He has no political sway. He has no real force in Iraq.
So, a statement of political reconciliation has been arrived at, but the question is, is there anything behind it but the shell of a Prime Minister that was? Does this deal make Maliki stronger or weaker as a Prime Minister?
Let's remember where the power resides, with the guns in the street.
(Sadr has not returned to the government. And what do the Iranians want?)
posted by mikevotes at
7:51 AM
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