Arming the Sunnis - trying to repeat past success in different circumstances

Let's start with this criticism of the current movement to arm certain insurgent Sunni groups in Baghdad to fight Al Qaeda.

But others contend the program has long-term repercussions that can only be guessed at now. By giving weapons and training to Sunnis in Anbar and Baghdad who've been previously associated with Sunni insurgent groups, the program endorses unofficial armed groups over official Iraqi forces as guarantors of Iraqi security, military officers who oppose the program say.

Those officers also say it abandons the long-stated U.S. goal of disarming militias and reinforces the idea that U.S.-trained Iraqi forces cannot control their country.

At the Pentagon, at least six officers who served in Iraq shook their heads when asked about the idea of arming the Sunnis. They said they had little faith in a Sunni community that was aggressively killing their comrades just months ago.

"Why did we spend all that capital disarming them last year?" asked one military officer who served in Iraq last year under former Iraq commander Gen. George Casey. "As a military man, I cannot fathom the logic of putting more weapons out there." The officer declined to be identified because he was not authorized to speak about the matter.

This effort to arm the Sunnis to fight Al Qaeda is based upon a somewhat similar, somewhat successful effort previously used in Anbar, however, the situation within Baghdad is notably different.

In the fighting in Anbar, the Sunni efforts were led by recognized, historical tribal and governmental leaders. The tension between foreign led Al Qaeda and nationalist Sunnis was really about longer term political control and leadership of Sunni lands. The Sunni groups there were fighting to reestablish traditional (family) control of local government.

In Baghdad, the situation is far more complex. Although the Sunni groups being armed and supported do have neighborhood ties, they don't have that longer tie to local power as they are largely composed of former Baathists. Their fight is not simply for a return of power within their land like in Anbar, but instead, it's a strategic step within a larger struggle against Shia domination.

Within Anbar, there is also not the complication of Shia militias, neighborhood "cleansing," and the larger "hot" elements of the civil war.

My point is that it's not the parallel that it's being painted.

(I'm not thinking very clearly this morning, so I can't tell if this makes sense or is muddled nonsense. If it is garbage, I'm sorry. Tune back in later.)