Active Duty Lt. Col. Accuses Iraq Generals of Failure
Wow. An active duty Lt. Col. ripping into the US Army leadership. (Notice this comes right after the "brilliant" Petraeus was all over Congress and TV. No coincidence, I'm sure.)
This is a huge statement from an active duty officer. For the dissent to get this public, I'm guessing that this dissatisfaction is fairly broad. More and more like Vietnam.
(It's a little long, so here's two prechewed versions. WaPo, AP.)
For the second time in a generation, the United States faces the prospect of defeat at the hands of an insurgency. In April 1975, the U.S. fled the Republic of Vietnam, abandoning our allies to their fate at the hands of North Vietnamese communists. In 2007, Iraq's grave and deteriorating condition offers diminishing hope for an American victory and portends risk of an even wider and more destructive regional war.
These debacles are not attributable to individual failures, but rather to a crisis in an entire institution: America's general officer corps. America's generals have failed to prepare our armed forces for war and advise civilian authorities on the application of force to achieve the aims of policy. The argument that follows consists of three elements. First, generals have a responsibility to society to provide policymakers with a correct estimate of strategic probabilities. Second, America's generals in Vietnam and Iraq failed to perform this responsibility. Third, remedying the crisis in American generalship requires the intervention of Congress.
This is a huge statement from an active duty officer. For the dissent to get this public, I'm guessing that this dissatisfaction is fairly broad. More and more like Vietnam.
(It's a little long, so here's two prechewed versions. WaPo, AP.)
posted by mikevotes at
8:00 AM
4 Comments:
When, in recorded history, has an non-permanent occupying foreign force EVER succeeded in the face of a determined local insurgency? When?
There is a difference between invading a country to capture it -- to take possession of it and bring it under your flag -- and this relatively modern notion of "fixing" a country you deem to be a "bad state." It is this this latter scenario I'm talking about.
By
-epm, at 10:10 AM
I've bounced that back and forth with a friend of mine who is a bit of a military historian.
There are some cases that are perhaps arguable in history, the definitions get kind of tough when you get into foreign efforts and puppet governments, but since the mass availability of the AK and cheap, powerful explosives, there really are none.
By
mikevotes, at 1:45 PM
So if the insurgents are fighting with anything more powerful than, say, slingshots, the balance of military power is about equal.
I'd suggest that setting up a puppet gvt is just a surrogate from of permanent occupancy.
There is no military solution to a determined insurgency. You need to make the insurgents less determined, and that is a political/diplomatic challenge... not one that is violently imposed.
As Harry Reid pointed out, the military mission was successfully accomplished four years ago with the routing of Saddam and the capture of Baghdad.
Just some thoughts bouncing in my head.
By
-epm, at 2:20 PM
Just flashing back random responses.
The power of the weaponry has to do with the ratio of the society that is willing to fight. Gandhi could throw out the British (relatively) nonviolently because of the huge number and percent of the people on his side who were willing to undertake action.
With the "force multiplying" AK or C4, you need fewer dedicated people. (That's probably not a good comparison, but you get my point.)
Second point, puppet governments can generate local support, even if it's only elites so they're a little different than a straight occupation force, although they are a component part of almost all occupations. (Not Israel Palestine for instance.)
Third point I agree with fully. The only way to end an insurgency is to eliminate the fuel.
By
mikevotes, at 2:41 PM
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